Compared to the classical cryptography, lattice-based cryptography is more secure, flexible and simple, and it is believed to be secure against quantum computers. In this paper, an efficient signature scheme is proposed from the ring learning with errors (R-LWE), which avoids sampling from discrete Gaussians and has the characteristics of the much simpler description etc. Then, the scheme is implemented in C/C++ and makes a comparison with the RSA signature scheme in detail. Additionally, a linearly homomorphic signature scheme without trapdoor is proposed from the R-LWE assumption. The security of the above two schemes are reducible to the worst-case hardness of shortest vectors on ideal lattices. The security analyses indicate the proposed schemes are unforgeable under chosen message attack model, and the efficiency analyses also show that the above schemes are much more efficient than other correlative signature schemes.
Introduction
Digital signature is one of the most important and widely used cryptographic primitives. At present all signature schemes from classical cryptography were proved to be either insecure or function-limited especially under quantum attacks [1] [2] [3] , so lattice-based cryptography has become a hot research topic because of its security. Since new trapdoors for hard lattices were developed successfully [4] , many lattice-based signature schemes have been proposed owing to the excellent algebraic characteristic, implementation simplicity, stronger security proofs of the lattice cryptography [5] [6] [7] .
Homomorphic signature is intriguing because which has been proved to be well-suited to guarantee information security in message-operated scenario, such as network coding, sensor networks and cloud storage etc [1, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Homomorphic signature can sign n-dimensional vectors 1 ,, l vv from a message space and outputs the signature i  of every vector i v . Given these signatures, the homomorphic property of signature scheme is that anyone can evaluate a signature on the vector 1 ( , , )
Homomorphic signature schemes were first given by Micali and Rivest for undirected graphs [13] . Subsequently Johnson proposed the basic definitions of homomorphic signature scheme and showed that a variety of homomorphic signature schemes can be designed [14] . The signature scheme from [5] was the first linear homomorphic scheme that authenticated vectors from binary fields, and its security was based on a new lattice problem, which is named k SIS  . Based on the trapdoor functions with preimage sampling [4] and a homomorphic hash function family, WANG FengHe gave a linely homomorphic signature scheme over binary field [15] . Using ideal lattices, Boneh et al presented the first homomorphic signature scheme for polynomial functions [6] , and then Catalano, Fiore and Warinschi provided an alternative to the homomorphic signature scheme of Boneh and Freeman [16] . All of the above homomorphic signature schemes have their corresponding advantages and application scenes. However, they tend to be inefficient for practical applications.
In order to resolve the efficiency problem, unlike GPV08 scheme that needs to generate a trapdoor and sample from discrete Gaussians, we give a more efficient signature scheme from the ring learning with errors (R-LWE) using the idea from Lyubashevsky [17] . Subsequently, based on the work of WANG FengHe, a more efficient linearly homomorphic signature scheme without trapdoor on signed data is presented in this paper. Because of the much more compact algebraic structure of the R-LWE problem, the efficiency of the proposed signature schemes is improved greatly, and the analyses show that schemes are secure in adaptive chosen message attack model, assuming that it is hard for probabilistic polynomial-time even quantum adversary to resolve the shortest vector problem on ideal lattices.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, the preliminaries are introduced firstly, and then a general lattice-based signature scheme is given and discussed in detail in Section 3. In Section 4, the definition of homomorphic signature is expounded firstly. Secondly, we propose an efficient linearly homomorphic signature scheme from R-LWE assumption. Finally, the security and the efficiency are analyzed in this Section. The whole paper is concluded in Section 5.
Preliminaries

Lattices
Lattice can be regarded as the set of discrete points with a regular structure in geometry, which can be described formally as follows. are linearly independent n -dimensional vectors, then the lattice can be defined as
Where 1 ,, n bb is a basis of the lattice, and its rank is n .
The standard worst-case approximation lattice problem GapSVP  is given in the decision version. Definition 2 (Shortest Vector Problem). Given a lattice basis
  , it is a NO instance, where the parameter ( ) 1 n   is a approximation factor and 1 ( ( )) LB  is the minimum distance of a lattice () LB . 
Learning with Errors over Rings (R-LWE)
Let ( ) 1 [ ], n f x x Z x    where 2 ( ) k n k Z  is a( ) ( ) ( ) h h h           , (2) ( ) ( ) h k kh    .
Signature Scheme
Scheme
First we give the probability distribution  which will be used in the following, and  is derived from a Gaussian. For any 0   , the density function of a Gaussian distribution over the real domain is given by Unlike GPV08 scheme that needs to generate a trapdoor and sample from discrete Gaussians, using the idea from Lyubashevsky, an efficient signature scheme 
, where 2 e is chosen independently from a probability distribution  .
• (( , ), , )
Polynomial addition is the usual coordinate-wise addition, and multiplication is the usual polynomial multiplication followed by reduction modulo 1 n x  . Claim 1. The signature scheme described above is correct.
Proof. Consider a signature 
Security Analysis
Claim 2. The scheme described above is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) in the random oracle model, assuming that the R-LWE is hard and hash function H is secure.
Proof. Let adversary be a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary that makes at most k signature queries. works as follows: 
Efficiency Analysis
Because of the special algebraic structure of R-LWE, the signature scheme from the R-LWE problem has the advantages of much simpler description, analysis and very high efficiency. The efficiency analysis of the scheme is shown in Table 1 . In the following parts, the scheme from R-LWE is compared with the RSA scheme on the same parametric conditions and operation environment. We use the same usual personal computer to evaluate the implementation performance of the two schemes: Running them on a Microsoft Windows XP Professional 2002 System, featuring a Pentium (R) D CPU processor, running at 3.0GHz, with 1.0GB of RAM. The implementation uses Shoup's NTL library version 5.5.2 for high-level numeric algorithms [19] , and the code is compiled using Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 compiler. Table 2 and Table 3 show the simulation results of the two different schemes respectively. Each test is repeated ten times and the datum shown in the two tables are the means of these ten different repetitions. As can be seen from Table 2 and Table 3 , the runtime of the scheme from R-LWE is more efficient than the RSA scheme under the same conditions, especially the key generation time and signature time. Regardless of the inefficiency of the verification compared to RSA scheme, the total runtime of our scheme is much more efficient than that of the RSA scheme with the increase of security parameter n . Modulus q takes the minimum integer satisfying corresponding conditions in the two schemes, and the length of messages encrypted in the two scheme is log nq bit. More detailed simulation results of the two above-described schemes are shown in Fig. 1-4 . Fig. 1, 2 and 3 indicate the efficiency of the key generation, signature and verification in the two schemes respectively, and the comparison of the total implementation time of the two schemes is shown in Fig. 4 . At the same time, the figures also show the change tendencies of the implementation time of the two encryption schemes along with the change of the security parameter n .
As can be seen from Fig 1-4 , the efficiency of the scheme from R-LWE is more eximious than the RSA signature scheme, and the increasing tendency of the scheme from R-LWE in runtime is much slower than that of the RSA scheme with the increase of security parameter n . Furthermore, the scheme from R-LWE is believed to be secure against quantum computers. 
The homomorphic signature scheme described above is defined as -homomorphic. Especially, if is composed of all integer linear functions, we say that the scheme is a linearly homomorphic signature scheme. Now we begin to describe the linearly homomorphic signature scheme proposed in this paper.
For any positive parameter 0   , the Gaussian function with center 0 over the real domain is given by 

Hence the conclusion is correct. 
Security Analysis
Efficiency Analysis
Because of the special algebraic structure of R-LWE, the linearly homomorphic signature scheme from R-LWE problem has the advantages of much simpler description, analysis and very high efficiency. Compared with the signature scheme of Boneh [5] , the efficiency improvement of our scheme is shown in Table 4 . psf and bt denote the computational cost of running preimage sampling functions (PSF) [4] and ExtBasis algorithm [20] respectively. The scheme of Boneh needs to use the ExtBasis algorithm and PSF to sign messages, and the PSF is a sub-algorithm of the ExtBasis algorithm.
As the PSF algorithm is rather inefficient, whose time complexity is Table 4 indicates that the scheme from R-LWE is more efficient than the scheme of Boneh, especially its public key, private key and operations for signature are incomparable to the scheme based on the PSF algorithm.
Conclusion
Digital signature can solve many security issues from internal and external malicious attacks in network coding, sensor networks and cloud storage etc. In order to guarantee the security of the network data, owing to the flexible structure and implementation simplicity of lattice cryptography, two efficient digital signature schemes from R-LWE assumption are proposed, and the analyses show that they are unforgeable in the chosen message attack model. The schemes mainly use modular addition and modular multiplication operations of the ring of integer polynomials, especially based on the special algebraic structure of R-LWE assumption, hence they are more efficient than previous interrelated signature schemes using ExtBasis or PSF algorithm. In the future, we will explore the fully homomorphic signature from lattice.
